2 days Ago By Firstpost
In the ever-changing geopolitics in South Asia, the interim leadership of Bangladesh under Muhammad Yunus has embarked on a bold diplomatic journey that is raising eyebrows in New Delhi. Since assuming power following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, Yunus has wasted no time in signalling a recalibration of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Yunus’ recent high-profile visit to China in March 2025—complete with meetings with President Xi Jinping and pitches for Chinese investment—marks a significant departure from the India-centric approach that defined Hasina’s 15-year tenure.
This move, cloaked as a pragmatic outreach for economic collaboration, carries deeper strategic undertones. Analysts see it as a calculated effort to leverage China’s growing influence in the region to pressure India, a neighbour with whom relations have grown frosty since Hasina’s exit. For India, this development is more than a diplomatic slight—it’s a potential game-changer.
Under Hasina’s regime, New Delhi enjoyed a privileged relationship with Dhaka, underpinned by security cooperation, economic ties, and a shared cultural legacy. Hasina’s government was a reliable partner, cracking down on anti-India insurgent groups and aligning with India’s regional vision. Yunus’s interim administration, however, appears intent on diversifying its alliances, with China emerging as a key player.
This shift comes at a time when India is already grappling with China’s expanding footprint in South Asia—from Pakistan’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Sri Lanka’s debt-laden ports. The prospect of Bangladesh, a nation sharing a 4,000-kilometre border with India, tilting toward Beijing is a strategic nightmare for New Delhi. Yunus’s overtures to China, coupled with his lukewarm engagement with India, suggest a deliberate attempt to reshape regional power dynamics.
A Strategic Shift The timing and tenor of Yunus’s visit to China in March 2025 speak volumes about his intentions. Accompanied by advisers on infrastructure, energy, and sustainable development, Yunus pitched Bangladesh as a manufacturing hub for Chinese firms, a move aimed at tapping into Beijing’s economic might. This wasn’t a mere trade mission; it was a diplomatic statement.
Reports indicate that Yunus sought to deepen ties in areas like renewable energy and health—sectors where China has global leverage. His participation in the Boao Forum for Asia and acceptance of an honorary doctorate from Peking University further underscore the symbolic weight of this outreach. For decades, Bangladesh’s foreign policy leaned heavily on India, a relationship cemented by New Delhi’s support during the 1971 Liberation War and sustained through economic and security partnerships.
Under Hasina, Dhaka balanced its ties with China but never at India’s expense. Yunus, however, appears to be charting a different course. His administration’s request for a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi went unanswered, prompting the China visit—a sequence that suggests a deliberate pivot.
This shift isn’t just about economics; it’s about gaining leverage. By cosying up to China, Yunus is signalling that Bangladesh has options beyond India, a message intended to force New Delhi to rethink its approach to the interim government. This strategic recalibration comes against the backdrop of strained India-Bangladesh ties.
Hasina’s presence in India since her ouster, coupled with Dhaka’s demands for her extradition, has fuelled tensions. Yunus’s public criticism of India for not engaging opposition parties during Hasina’s rule has added to the friction. In this context, his China outreach reads as a pressure tactic—an attempt to remind India that Bangladesh can turn to a rival power if its concerns are ignored.
China’s Growing Influence and India’s Concerns China’s interest in Bangladesh is hardly new, but Yunus’s leadership offers Beijing a fresh opportunity to deepen its foothold in India’s backyard. As Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, China has long supplied infrastructure loans and military hardware to Dhaka. Projects like the Padma Bridge and power plants bear Beijing’s imprint, part of its broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to encircle India with economic dependencies.
Yunus’s visit has elevated this relationship, with talks of expanded collaboration raising the spectre of Chinese naval presence in the Bay of Bengal—a region India considers its strategic sphere. For India, this is a red flag. The 2020 border clash with China in Ladakh underscored Beijing’s willingness to challenge New Delhi militarily.
Since then, India has faced a two-front security dilemma, with China and its ally Pakistan exerting pressure from the north and west. A Bangladesh more aligned with China adds a third dimension to this threat. Analysts warn that Chinese investments could translate into political influence, potentially turning Dhaka into a proxy in Beijing’s rivalry with India.
The memory of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, ceded to China after debt default, looms large—could Bangladesh’s ports follow a similar path? Moreover, China’s diplomatic warmth toward Yunus contrasts sharply with India’s cautious stance. Beijing has called Yunus an “old friend”, a nod to his global stature as a Nobel laureate. This personal rapport could cement a long-term partnership, especially as Yunus seeks to stabilise his interim rule amid domestic unrest and calls for early elections.
For India, the stakes are high: a Bangladesh drifting into China’s orbit undermines New Delhi’s regional leadership and security architecture, amplifying the deadly combo of Yunus’s ambitions and China’s opportunism. A Deadly Combo The Yunus-China axis is a significant threat for India, not because it guarantees conflict but because it shifts the regional balance at a time when New Delhi can ill afford distractions. With the US and China locked in a global rivalry, India has positioned itself as a counterweight to Beijing through alliances like the Quad.
Yet, a Bangladesh tilting toward China undermines that narrative, portraying India as unable to manage its own neighbourhood. This perception could weaken India’s credibility on the world stage, just as it seeks a permanent UN Security Council seat. New Delhi must respond with urgency and ingenuity.
First, it should engage Yunus directly, offering economic incentives—trade deals and infrastructure aid—to counter China’s largesse. A Modi-Yunus summit, perhaps at the upcoming BIMSTEC meeting in Thailand, could reset the tone. Second, India must bolster its security cooperation with Bangladesh, emphasising shared threats like terrorism to rebuild trust.
Third, New Delhi should accelerate its own regional connectivity projects, like the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway, to outpace China’s Belt and Road Initiative in influence. Finally, India must rally like-minded partners—Japan, Australia, and the US—to invest in Bangladesh, diluting China’s dominance. Ignoring Yunus’s gambit is not an option.
His China pivot is a pressure play, but it’s also an opportunity for India to reassert its leadership. The alternative—a Bangladesh tethered to Beijing—threatens to unravel decades of strategic gains. In this high-stakes game, India must act decisively to neutralise the deadly combo before it takes root.
Muhammad Yunus’s expanding diplomatic relationship with China is more than a footnote in South Asian politics—it’s a challenge to India’s regional dominance. By leveraging Beijing’s economic and strategic clout, Yunus is pressuring New Delhi to rethink its approach to Bangladesh. For India, the stakes are high: a neighbour overly aligned with China could compromise its national security, economic stability, and global influence.
The Yunus-China combo is deadly not because it’s invincible but because it exploits India’s complacency. New Delhi must respond with a blend of diplomacy, investment, and resolve to reclaim its influence. In a region where power is increasingly contested, India cannot afford to blink.
The author, a columnist and research scholar, teaches journalism at St. Xavier’s College (autonomous), Kolkata. His handle on X is @sayantan_gh.
Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views..
