5 days Ago
When a powerful country comes courting, a smaller country is wise not to reject the courtship out of hand, even if it isn't fully swayed or convinced. The lesser of the two powers may appear to be an eager, willing and ready partner, but there may well be a measure of ambiguity behind the ready acquiescence and responsive smile. Beijing has repeatedly urged Bangkok to inject some speed into a delay-ridden rail project designed to connect Thailand to China via Laos by high-speed train.
As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it to the Thais earlier this year, "The two sides should speed up the development of the China-Thailand Railway and push for an early realisation of the China-Laos-Thailand Connectivity Development Corridor". Despite constant prodding from China, including Xi Jinping, and vested interest groups on the Thai side, such as the CP conglomerate led by Dhanin Chearavanont and the pro-rail project strategising of Pansak Vinyaratn for the Shinawatra clan, the Thai government has been taking its time. Reasons for the delays are multifold.
It's part due to the shifting nature of the Bangkok government that has, since the project's inception, gone from coup to military rule to military-civilian rule, to a civilian caretaker government, to a tempestuous election cycle in which the party with the most votes was disqualified, resulting in the current coalition government that includes both conservative, pro-military elements and the daughter of the quixotic Thaksin Shinawatra, who was allowed to return to Thailand after a long exile on the condition that he spend some time in jail. Covid undoubtedly slowed things down a bit too. Still, the rapid expansion of Bangkok's BTS and MRT during the same period are proof positive that infrastructure projects can be built quickly if sufficient political will is present.
The Lao section of China's Belt and Road, a high-speed train designed for an eventual link from Kunming to Singapore, is up and running, mostly shuttling Chinese cargo back and forth since the average Lao can hardly afford it. The Thai portion of the project remains in limbo, and Malaysia seems to be of two minds about the through train to Singapore as well. The small percentage of track laid to date may be disappointing to the impatient powers that be in China, but is there not a method to the madness if the end result gives Thais more agency in what is essentially a China-constructed and largely China-controlled train line piercing the heartland of Thailand? Rejecting outright Chinese financing of the project, nixing land concessions and trying to tiptoe around the questions of political indebtedness inevitably led to delays, delays well worth the wait for the sake of sovereignty.
Even so, Thai investors acknowledge they have already borrowed deeply, including Chinese capital, for an investment which even under the rosiest circumstances will take decades to recoup. Delays due to environmental concerns may not be much of an issue in an autocratic state like China, where a massive high-speed rail network criss-crosses the land. It's an impressive feat, but it was literally railroaded through, without citizen consent.
Thailand, while not entirely democratic, allows room for civic activism and free speech; it's got a vital civil society in which stakeholders high and low have at least some say in the matter. Whether it be small land-holding farmers in Nakhon Ratchasima province and or aesthetic concerns linked to historical preservation, such as the somewhat unwelcome spectre of big brassy trains barreling through the outskirts of historic Ayutthaya, citizen voices do matter. Then there are political perturbations, ranging from what looked like politically-driven cooperation under former prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha to the concerns of opposition figures such as Pita Limjaroenrat, who recently told a Harvard audience that Thailand needs to focus on building local train networks to alleviate traffic and help small farmers.
Between these two poles -- the fast train from China that stands to benefit corporations and the rich, and the incremental improvement of small-gauge lines commensurate with the needs of farmers and ordinary citizens, politicians have an important role to play. The squabbles and quibbles, while inefficient, have the salutatory effect of buying time for a project that will lock Thailand tightly into China's Belt and Road scheme for years to come. Thailand has been railroaded before, especially in the early days of the Cold War when a few corrupt and opportunistic politicians pocketed US money to pave the way for seven massive US air bases on Thai soil.
That was the beginning of a "beautiful friendship" in which US Cold Warriors transformed Thailand into a US-dominated bulwark dedicated to the project of fighting communism. Outside of the direct beneficiaries of US largesse and a handful of ideologues, few Thais were enthused, but the nation went along for the ride, extracting what advantage it could as a strong cash wind blew in from the West. The US bases, the Friendship Highway and the flurry of infrastructure projects funded by the US, designed first and foremost to support the war effort, constituted the Belt and Road of its day.
The US lost in Vietnam, and was asked to withdraw its bases in Thailand, creating an opening for China, which, for a brief period, shared the US and Thai agenda of resisting Vietnamese influence in Indochina. Since then, Thailand has been effectively orbited by two foreign "suns". China and the US are both powerful partners vying for influence in geopolitics, investment and trade.
Turning away from ideology towards trade and opening up, China has made great inroads in the last few decades, building on the appeal of shared prosperity, new technology and age-old ethnic ties. America remains a player, despite years of neglecting its old ally. It's not just the English-speaking Americanised elite that wish for better relations with the US; even Thais critical of the US see it as a balancer to outsized Chinese influence.
The point is, balancing doesn't work if you lean too much to one side or the other. There's room for cooperation with both the US and China; it's not a competition or a zero sum game, despite what hardliners in both the US and China might like to believe. The question is where to draw the line.
Unlike those stifling days during the height of the Cold War when autocratic generals such as Sarit Thanarat and Thanom Kittikachorn could run the country like a private fiefdom, Thailand is a much more open and complex country now, with a veritable world city as its capital. Why rush madly into building an express train to and from China, when creating a network of light rail to alleviate domestic traffic congestion will serve both farmers and factories in the hinterland? Thailand keeps nodding yes to the big train from the big neighbour above, and it's possible those saying yes mean yes, but sometimes yes means no, and in the very least, yes does not mean unconditional consent. Whether the ambiguity created by Thai foot-dragging is born of confusion or is an instinctive strategic stance remains to be determined, but the date of completion for the rail project keeps getting pushed further into the future.
In this sense, ambiguity and even apparent inefficiency can be useful in retaining agency in the face of imperious demands from powerful outsiders. Inasmuch as the foot-dragging is a passive-aggressive approach, diplomatic disappointment is bound to follow, but in the meantime, everyone appears to be getting along, even if they're not getting what they want, and that's preferable to outright conflict. Thais have shown over the centuries a knack for coming to terms with powerful influences, from the earliest days of absorbing Indic and Khmer influences, to playing Britain and France off one another during the colonial period, from the short-lived resistance to Japan to "cooperation" and back to resistance again.
Even during the Vietnam War heyday of heavily lopsided US influence in Thailand, friendly feelers were quietly being put out to China, and it was upon the soil of such clandestine efforts that the seeds of Sino-Thai relations took root and finally blossomed. Thailand is again at an inflexion point, being buffeted by winds from the east and the west. Call it bamboo bending in the wind, or political resourcefulness or deceptive opportunism, there is something to be said for a gentle, non-confrontational way of handling disagreements.
Over time, being flexible has served Thais well in maintaining a high degree of agency and independence against baffling odds. Philip J Cunningham is a media researcher covering Asian politics. He is the author of 'Tiananmen Moon'.
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