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Former General Prabowo Subianto will be sworn in as Indonesia’s eighth president today. Twenty-five years ago he was a pariah, and for good reason. He faced accusations of human rights abuses in Papua and East Timor, and in 1998, special forces troops under his command had democracy activists in Jakarta, 13 of whom have never been seen again.
Those who did return had been . The students had been calling for the resignation of President Soeharto, Prabowo’s father-in-law, who finally stepped down in May 1998 after widespread rioting that many believe Prabowo helped engineer. Then, backed by troops under his command, Prabowo the presidential palace, gun in hand, to threaten the new president, BJ Habibie.
Prabowo for the disappearances of the activists, though he was banned from travelling to the United States for two decades. And his cherished military career quickly ended – he was dismissed from the army for “misinterpreting orders”. Disgraced, and seen as embodying the violence and repression of Soeharto’s regime, Prabowo went into voluntary exile in Jordan.
It seemed he had no future in the democratic (reformation) system that began to emerge from the ruins of the repressive . But Prabowo was far from finished. His rehabilitation and extraordinary climb to the presidency may now signal the end of Indonesia’s fragile, aspirational liberal democracy and a return to the New Order model.
The end of Reformasi? It is clear enough that Prabowo has no enthusiasm for democracy. He has , for example, that it “very, very tiring” and “very, very messy and costly”. Gerindra, the political party he founded and leads, even has, as its number one mission statement, “as stipulated on 18 August 1945”.
This is the authoritarian original version of the Constitution that Soeharto relied on to rule. It did not guarantee human rights or a separation of powers, and it gave huge power to the president, who was not elected and had no term limit. This Constitution was amended after Soeharto fell to bring in a liberal, democratic model.
So, a return to the original 1945 Constitution would in itself likely end Indonesia’s hard-won, if troubled, democracy. But Prabowo may not need to go this far to enjoy the sweeping power his former father-in-law exercised. Many of the elements of the New Order are already in place.
Much of the work of dismantling Indonesia’s liberal democracy has already been done by the outgoing president, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), whose son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, is now Prabowo’s vice president. For example, a key pillar of the New Order was “dual function”, a doctrine that allowed serving military members to take civilian posts, allowing them to dominate the government. This was abolished after Soeharto fell.
But amendments to the civil service law passed last October again allow active members of the army and police to occupy civilian positions. Proposed amendments to the now being debated could expand this. When questioned about the army’s return to civilian life, the , saying the army would not be exercising a “dual function” but a “multi-function”.
Likewise, under Soeharto, repressive laws tightly restricted press freedom. Now, a controversial that comes into force in 2026 will reinstate prohibitions on criticising the government that the Constitutional Court had previously struck out. A proposed would also ban “broadcasting investigative journalism content”.
Under the New Order, civil society activism was also harshly restricted. In the last ten years under Jokowi, there has been a steady . And a law passed in 2017 allows the government to dissolve non-governmental organisations without any judicial process.
Already, three NGOs . Many activists now speak openly of their fear of being by government trolls or even the intelligence agencies. Others fear Prabowo will use his links to Muslim civil society organisations to he sees as critics.
Keeping the elites happy Prabowo is also following in the footsteps of Soeharto and Jokowi by building a in the national legislature, the DPR. More than 80% of members are already on board, with only one party holding out. Prabowo will also , allowing him to award places to supporters and co-opt others, including members of civil society.
This will further weaken the opposition. This kind of government of elite “unity” makes politics opaque. Political fights take place behind the scenes, resolved by power plays and deals before measures go to a vote.
It would make the national legislature not much more than a rubber stamp, as it was under Soeharto. This assumes Prabowo can manage Indonesia’s powerful political bosses – especially the Megawati Soekarnoputri and Jokowi. Together, they now control the two biggest parties in the legislature (PDI-P and Golkar, respectively).
The still hugely popular Jokowi backed his former bitter enemy Prabowo in the February elections because he saw this as a way to maintain influence after he left office. But Prabowo will be reluctant to share real power with anyone for long. His relationship with Jokowi is likely to be one the biggest challenges to his rule.
Dealing with an obstructive court One of the few remaining obstacles to Prabowo acquiring the sort of dictatorial powers Soeharto exercised is the Constitutional Court, which has the power to strike out laws. Prabowo will not want a non-compliant and obstructive (that is, independent) Constitutional Court. Already politicians are openly discussing the need to “ ”.
If the legislature passes laws to weaken the court, the court could just strike them out, as it has done in the past. But the court was established by the amendments to the original 1945 Constitution. This means that if government cannot pass laws to weaken the court, stack the court or intimidate independent judges, a return to the 1945 Constitution could be used to eliminate it.
Prabowo would need to feel his rule is secure and that he has the rock-solid support of the elites before doing this, but it is certainly possible. Returning to the original Constitution would simply require a two-thirds vote in the MPR, Indonesia’s highest representative assembly. Bold promises on the economy Soeharto’s system was based on a Faustian bargain that allowed him to rule corruptly and oppressively in return for high economic growth and development that lifted millions out of poverty.
Prabowo is likely to adopt the same approach. He on an annual GDP growth target of 8%, a rate reached under Soeharto, but never by subsequent governments. Jokowi also placed great emphasis on development (infrastructure in particular), but never got much above 5% growth per year.
Many are optimistic about the economy under the new president. Prabowo’s father was a prominent economist and a finance minister. Prabowo has also Jokowi’s highly-regarded finance minister, Sri Mulyani, to stay in her role.
However, Prabowo comes to office with some enormously expensive commitments that would make Sri Mulyani’s job extremely difficult. These include his (upwards of US$30 billion, or A$45 billion), which Sri Mulyani has publicly questioned, and Jokowi’s signature new capital city, Nusantara, currently under construction. (The initial phase alone will cost at least .
Moreover, Prabowo’s main priority will be to keep the elites happy and maintain his enormous coalition. His supporters and allies – including his brother, tycoon Hashim Djojohadikusumo who has – will all demand access to concessions and lucrative appointments for their cronies to make good the vast amounts spent on the February elections. Rational economic policy-making will therefore be highly constrained.
Foreign investment has always been the key to high growth in Indonesia, but despite the constant rhetoric about Indonesia being open for business, it will undoubtedly remain protectionist in practice under Prabowo. That will likely make the 8% GDP annual growth target impossible. More active foreign relations Prabowo, who was educated overseas and speaks English fluently, feels comfortable on the global stage.
He will want a more prominent place in world affairs for his country, reflecting its vast size and new status as a middle-income country. As Jokowi’s defence minister, he was active internationally, even attempting to broker a between Russia and Ukraine. And, to his obvious delight, countries like the US that had previously denied him entry have on his victory.
Prabowo’s main foreign affairs challenge will be the same as his predecessor’s: managing the difficult relationship with China. Indonesians are deeply suspicious of China, an attitude driven by a potent mixture of deeply rooted racist attitudes, fear of communism and anxiety about China’s hegemonic ambitions. However, Indonesia is a major recipient of and the elite rely heavily on Chinese trade and investment.
Like Jokowi, Prabowo will have to manage this difficult balance. Back to the future Indonesian civil society leaders are already talking about the new administration as “New Order Volume II” or “neo-New Order”, and it is easy to see why. All the signs point to a continuation under Prabowo of the process begun under Jokowi: a slide towards something that looks much more like Soeharto’s system than the liberal democracy reformers tried to construct 25 years ago.
There is nothing in Prabowo’s past or his campaign promises to suggest otherwise. Perhaps the only question is how quickly it happens and how far he will go. To remove this article -.
