2 weeks Ago By Noreen-jameel
This past September , top US officials leading Middle East policy for Joe Biden decided that a major course correction was necessary. It had been almost a year since Hamas launched its deadly attack on Israel and little progress had been made to bring about a ceasefire or the release of more hostages. At the same time, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which joined its ally Hamas on 8 October, 2023, by launching missiles at Israeli military sites, stubbornly refused to de-link its “solidarity front” with Gaza despite increasingly painful attacks by Israel on its fighting capabilities as well as the Shia population of Lebanon, which is largely supportive of the armed militia and political party.
Even though the US elections were only weeks away, and Biden campaign staffers had good reason to believe the President was being dragged down in some key states by his unwavering support for Israel and its widely destructive actions in Gaza and Lebanon, Team Biden decided to finally relent and “ agree ” with longstanding Israeli demands for widening the scope of the war against Hezbollah. The move was effectively an endorsement, however tacit or unsure at first, of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s position that such an escalation would decisively undermine Hezbollah’s ability and desire to stay in the fight with Hamas – while dealing a significant blow to its ability to threaten Israel in the future. The most spectacular articulation of the new US-Israeli approach came fast and furious with the assassination of Hezbollah’s longstanding chief, Hassan Nasrallah , on 27 September, using more than 80 US bunker-busting bombs in a densely packed Beirut neighbourhood.
While some US officials were reportedly “ infuriated ” over the operation at first, their anger and concerns were rapidly overtaken by the administration’s enthusiasm for the new, far more aggressive approach. The Pentagon stopped emphaiszing the urgent need for de-escalation and diplomatic solutions. Biden administration officials made it clear to Hezbollah’s main backer, Iran, that if it struck Israel in retaliation it would find it “ difficult to restrain Israel.
” And previous US opposition to any land invasion of southern Lebanon turned into an endorsement. According to Politico and other news outlets, even Biden’s main diplomat trying to negotiate a ceasefire, Amos Hochstein, privately backed the doctrinal shift, reportedly describing Israel’s wide bombardment campaign in Lebanon as a history-defining moment. Other reports said US officials were so pleased about the early returns from the “Escalate to De-escalate” doctrine that they started using their newfound battlefield leverage in domestic Lebanese politics, to try to force the election of a US-supported presidential candidate (the top post has been absent for more than two years).
Although the results of the US elections were still weeks away, Team Biden’s enthusiasm was aligned with the excitement expressed by Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who used to run Middle East policy during the first Trump administration and who will likely be influential in the new one. “The Middle East is too often a solid where little changes,” Kushner wrote shortly after Nasrallah’s killing. “Today, it is a liquid, and the ability to reshape is unlimited.
Do not squander this moment.” By the time Trump was declared the winner of the US election in early November, Hezbollah and the wider Lebanese population had taken a sustained series of ever-heavier blows. Thousands of Lebanese civilians were killed or wounded.
Hundreds or possibly thousands of Hezbollah fighters were taken off the battlefield, as was a significant portion of the group’s ability to project military power into Israel through rockets, missiles and storming troops. Up until the last moment of the ceasefire this past week, though, Hezbollah still managed to keep up a sustained rate of launches. They exacted steadily more serious damage and casualties, including in civilian areas of Tel Aviv and military bases deep inside Israel.
And they put up a strong defence in South Lebanon which played a major role in limiting Israel’s ground inclusion to only a few kilometres inside the country. All of these military actions on the part of Hezbollah also undoubtedly raised pressure on Netanyahu to finally go for a ceasefire when he did – almost 14 months after Hezbollah first attacked – rather than continuing to expend munitions on fewer high-value targets and men on what was clearly turning into a grinding ground operation. When Hezbollah did effectively tap out – breaking the “unity of arenas” doctrine with Hamas and others that it had said was unshakable, and agreeing to have only an unarmed presence in much of South Lebanon – the Biden, Trump and Netanyahu teams all effectively converged in self-congratulations.
“Escalate to De-escalate” had worked, even against what – until this past September – was widely considered to be the most powerful non-state military actor in the world. Israel can use its superior military power to change its enemies’ behaviour. More than this, the ability to reshape the Middle East might really be “unlimited,” as Kushner had foretold just two months before.
The sobering reality, however, is that replacing the old Trump doctrine of Maximum Pressure with Maximum Force comes with significant dangers. The “collateral damage” of the escalation has been immense. Tens of thousands of women and children have been killed and injured in Gaza and Lebanon.
Millions have been displaced, with hundreds of thousands of civilian housing units destroyed. International humanitarian law – already in a tenuous position for decades – lies decidedly in tatters, with Israeli leaders and the Israeli state itself variously in the dock at the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court. In Lebanon, Israel’s wide-ranging bombing campaign resulted in the razing of dozens of villages, especially along the border.
All the death and destruction – at many points seemingly without distinction or proportionality – will resonate for generations, stoking further hatred in a region that already had more than enough. It will also be likely to instil the conviction among the next set of fighters, and quite possibly states, that ultra-violence can only be met by the same – or at least the credible threat of mass destruction for mass destruction, if the tools can be found. Even in the immediate period, the escalation of recent weeks by Israel, backed by the US, is unlikely to mark a period of de-escalation – as was originally promised by its proponents.
In fact, there is a serious risk that the short-term “successes” of the doctrine will rapidly give way to even heavier escalation. Over the last several days, the ceasefire in Lebanon has been shaken by Israeli strikes. Hezbollah is likely to quickly replenish its military capabilities outside of the exclusion zone of South Lebanon, which will lead to further Israeli strikes and possibly the quick end of the ceasefire.
There are also serious fears that a weakened Hezbollah may either lash out or be violently challenged by its opponents inside the country, some of whom have blood debts to settle. And in Syria, where opposition forces are now trying to overrun areas held by President Bashar Assad – a vital ally of Hezbollah and Iran – a new escalation dynamic appears to have been unleashed which is predicated on the recent weakening of both Hezbollah and Iran. However, the most serious danger with the approach lies in how it is increasing the chances of a direct war between Iran and Israel.
The decapitation of Hezbollah, Iran’s most powerful ally in the region, now stands as proof of concept that massive force, unbridled by law or much concern over long-term or unintended consequences, works in substantially reshaping the balance of power. Read Next The Arab world has been crushed between two jaws Israeli leaders have long described Iran as “the head of the octopus,” their only real remaining enemy in the Middle East, without which peace with the holdout Arab monarchies and dictators would quickly fall into place. The prize of regional normalisation is thus tantalisingly close – as many Israeli leaders profess – if Iran’s regime could just be deleted as Hebzollah’s leadership was.
Either way, Iran’s nuclear programme, with the possibility of posing mass destruction for mass destruction is a powerful motivation for one more escalation. With Trump set to take office in only a few weeks, Netanyahu will have in place an administration that looks to be far more supportive of “Escalate to De-escalate” than Team Biden was even in the waning weeks of their authority. And Netanyahu has something else that Trump is impressed by: the successful application of power.
Of course, there are some divisions within Trump’s coalition and his inner circle over bringing a Maximum Force hammer to bear against Iran. But insider opponents of a more aggressive approach by Israel or the US are clearly in the minority. Even though a war with Iran would likely be vastly more destructive and long-lasting than what transpired in Lebanon, Trump’s emerging team contains many of the same kind of true believers in their power and righteousness that Netanyahu’s government has.
Most importantly, both appear ready, willing and able to sweep aside concerns over where still more escalation might lead – this time with a powerful state actor at the crossroads of the world – and seize the “liquid” moment that Team Biden teed up for them..
