Exit Polling Analysis Part II -- Religion, Education, Marital Status, and Other Groupings

In Part I of this new series, I took a look at what the exit polls have been telling us about how this most recent electoral disaster stacks up against previous Presidential elections going back to 2012, using data primarily from the NBC news exit polls for 2024, 2020, 2016, and 2012. But before we get to the new stuff, I also ran across the CNN exit polls for 2024 (nearly 23,000 total respondents) and 2020 (15,600) that allow a deeper dive into some of the demographics using various filters, though unfortunately that feature doesn’t extend further back than 2020. So here’s one more table looking at how the different Age Groups changed in their political orientation since 2020 based on Gender:Dem-Rep Margin and Vote Share by Gender/Age GroupGender/AgeGroup Margin:20202024VoteShare:20202024Men 18-2911%-2%8%7%Men 30-44-1%-10%11%12%Men 45-64-15%-22%19%16%Men 65+-17%-11%11%12%Women 18-2935%24%9%7%Women 30-4414%11%12%12%Women 45-6413%-1%19%19%Women 65+5%9%12%16%Not much change in the relative vote shares among the different Gender/Age Group blocks, except that the youngest continue to shrink (young women slightly more so than young men) and the oldest expand (particularly senior women), though the significant drop-off in Men 45-64 is a bit curious. Surprisingly, it is actually Gen-X women (45-64) that had the biggest net shift to the Republicans at -14%, though the youngest blocks of both genders weren’t far behind (-13% for men and -11% for women). Also surprising is that while seniors (65+) of both genders were the only blocks to actually move Left in this election, men actually did so at a slightly faster rate than women (6% vs 4%), though of course they still have a greater distance to go. Note also that the Gender Gap between women and men is now the largest for the youngest voting block (26%), whereas in 2020 it was for Gen-Xers at 28%. And as I noted in Part I’s analysis, this is almost entirely being driven by young Latino (and to a much lesser degree Black) voters since young white voters are actually moving to the Left now.Moving on, let’s now consider the trends observable in religious affiliation (or lack thereof) as exemplified in the above title chart:Vote Share by ReligionReligion2012201620202024Protestant53%52%43%42%Catholic25%23%25%22%Jewish2%3%2%2%Something Else7%8%8%10%None12%15%22%24%White Evangelical26%26%28%22%Everyone Else74%74%72%78%The first thing to note here is the dramatic drop in the Protestant vote between 2016 and 2020, the gradual increase in “Something Else” (Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, etc), and the far more significant increase in “None” (Atheists, Agnostics, etc). Note also the significant drop in the White Evangelical vote this year despite a slight rise in the previous election — for the first time ever they’re now outnumbered by the “Nones”! Perhaps at least some of them have at long last seen the utterly craven moral hypocrisy that is at the center so many fundamentalist Evangelical churches now and no longer wish to be associated with them? We can only hope this trend continues to accelerate.Dem-Rep Margin by ReligionReligion2012201620202024Protestant-15%-17%-21%-27%Catholic2%-4%5%-18%Jewish39%48%?56%Something Else51%33%40%25%None44%42%34%45%White Evangelical-57%-64%-52%-65%All Others23%26%26%17%The main thing to note here, aside from the steady slide of most Protestants toward Republicans, is the huge lunge by Catholics in the same direction this year, despite their history of being fairly centrist in orientation — this being driven largely by the radical change we’ve already seen in the Latino vote. It might also be worth noting that while Gaza may not have reduced Jewish support for Democrats (if anything, it may actually have ticked up as a result of Biden and Harris largely failing to rein in Israeli actions), it certainly took a toll among Muslim-Americans and other religious minorities.Now let’s turn to the traditional counterpart of Religion — Education:Dem-Rep Margin and Vote Share by Education/RaceEducation/Race Margin201620202024VoteShare201620202024White College Grad-3%3%7%37%32%33%Non-White Col Grad50%40%33%13%10%10%White Non-College-37%-35%-34%34%35%39%Non-White Non-Col56%46%30%16%24%19%While getting a college education is definitely a demarcation line when it comes to political preferences among white voters (where we’ve seen a 10% move to the Left for college grads since 2016, compared to a more feeble 3% drift among non-college grads), the same cannot be said for non-white voters. And though the drop in Democratic support among non-white college grads (-17%) hasn’t been quite as bad as for those without a college degree (-26%), they’re both moving in the wrong direction. It’s also worth noting the significant drop off in vote share among all college grads from 2016 to 2020 that continued into this year’s election. This isn’t a reflection of fewer college grads voting now, but rather the success of both the Biden and Trump campaigns in mobilizing large numbers of non-college grads who had seldom if ever voted before 2020, and which continues to affect the results in 2024.Next we’ll consider the role Marital Status is playing:Vote Share by Marital Status/GenderMarital Status/Gender2012201620202024Married Men29%29%30%28%Married Women31%30%26%26%Non-Married Men18%18%20%20%Non-Married Women23%23%23%27%The only thing really worth noting in terms of relative vote share is the sudden drop in Married Women between 2016 and 2020 who have traditionally constituted the largest block, and how Married Men now actually outnumber them for the first time. Likewise, despite a small bump up in 2020, Non-Married Men still constitute the smallest block here and are increasingly outnumbered by Non-Married Women. Note also from the top table in this diary that the surge in Non-Married Women is being driven by the oldest age cohort (65+) — so even though the Harris campaign wasn’t terribly successful in turning out younger women voters, they certainly excelled in mobilizing the grandmothers among us.Dem-Rep Margin by Marital Status/GenderMarital Status/Gender2012201620202024Married Men-22%-19%-11%-22%Married Women-7%2%-4%-3%Non-Married Men-16%2%7%-2%Non-Married Women36%29%27%21%Not quite sure what to make of this table, except to note that the Gender Gap between Married Men and Women was actually a bit higher at 21% than this year’s 19%, and between Non-Married Men and Women it was absolutely enormous (52%) back in 2012 for some reason. The most disturbing trend here is the steady deterioration in Democratic support among their most supportive voting block of Non-Married Women — particularly with issue of reproductive rights and access to abortion being so prominent in this year’s election.Now for some miscellaneous comparisons. First up, the LGBTQ vote:Vote Share by Sexual OrientationSexual Orientation2012201620202024LGBTQ5%5%7%8%All Others95%95%93%92%While I doubt the size of the LGBTQ community has actually grown much over the years, the fraction of the voting public willing to so self-identify has certainly expanded.Dem-Rep Margin by Sexual OrientationSexual Orientation2012201620202024LGBTQ54%63%37%73%All Others0%0%3%-8%Something here doesn’t quite make sense since it implies the LGBTQ vote was the deciding factor in both 2012 and 2016, and even though Clinton apparently ran up a bigger margin in that vote than Obama, Obama’s popular vote margin (3.9%) was nearly double that of Clinton’s (2.1%). Likewise, why the relatively large drop in the margin for Biden? Did a significant chunk of the LGBTQ community suddenly think Trump was less of a threat in 2020 than 2016? At least they figured things out for this election and gave Harris their biggest margin ever — unlike certain other blocks (Women in general and Latinos) who definitely picked up on the wrong message.Next up, the Union Household vote:Vote Share by Union Household StatusUnion HouseholdStatus2012201620202024Union Household18%18%20%19%All Others82%82%80%81%Biden was at least successful in turning out more Union Household voters in 2020.Dem-Rep Margin by Union Household StatusUnion HouseholdStatus2012201620202024Union Household18%9%16%8%All Others1%-1%2%-3%Harris unfortunately was not as successful at keeping them voting a Democratic ticket.Next to consider is the Military vote:Dem-Rep Margin and Vote Share by Military StatusMilitary StatusMargin:201620202024VoteShare:201620202024Military-26%-10%-31%13%15%12%Non-Military6%8%2%87%85%88%While traditionally leaning toward Republicans, the Military vote this time was a real gut punch considering the lengths Trump went in denigrating military service in general and his Alrington Cemetary stunt in particular.Now onto the perpetually perplexed — those voters who only managed to decide who they were going to vote for at the proverbial last minute:Dem-Rep Margin and Vote Share by Decision TimeDecision TimeMargin:2012201620202024VoteShare:2012201620202024Final Week6%-3%-12%-9%9%13%5%7%Before Final Week4%3%4%0%89%85%91%92%That’s rather disturbing if those who couldn’t make up their minds on who to support until the final week of the election all came down on the Trump side of things — and they apparently helped provide Trump with his winning margin this time.And finally, at least for this installment, the First-Time voter:Dem-Rep Margin and Vote Share on 1st Time voter Status1st-Time StatusMargin:201620202024VoteShare:2016202020241st-Time Voter19%32%-13%10%14%8%Not 1st-Time Voter0%0%-2%90%84%92%And there we have it. First-Time voters (a combination of those who just turn 18 since the previous election, and those who had simply never bothered to vote before) who had given both Clinton and Biden their popular vote mandates turned decisively against Harris and sealed all our fates for at least the next four years, and possibly forever.In part III, I’ll examine the all-important question of Economics and what role it played in this election; but until then I highly recommend the analysis of Ben Davis in The Guardian over the weekend.

In Part I of this new series, I took a look at what the exit polls have been telling us about how this most recent electoral disaster stacks up against previous Presidential elections going back to 2012, using data primarily from the NBC news exit polls for 2024 , 2020 , 2016 , and 2012 . But before we get to the new stuff, I also ran across the CNN exit polls for 2024 (nearly 23,000 total respondents) and 2020 (15,600) that allow a deeper dive into some of the demographics using various filters, though unfortunately that feature doesn’t extend further back than 2020. So here’s one more table looking at how the different Age Groups changed in their political orientation since 2020 based on Gender: Dem-Rep Margin and Vote Share by Gender/Age Group Gender/Age Group Margin: 2020 2024 Vote Share: 2020 2024 Men 18-29 11% -2% 8% 7% Men 30-44 -1% -10% 11% 12% Men 45-64 -15% -22% 19% 16% Men 65+ -17% -11% 11% 12% Women 18-29 35% 24% 9% 7% Women 30-44 14% 11% 12% 12% Women 45-64 13% -1% 19% 19% Women 65+ 5% 9% 12% 16% Not much change in the relative vote shares among the different Gender/Age Group blocks, except that the youngest continue to shrink (young women slightly more so than young men) and the oldest expand (particularly senior women), though the significant drop-off in Men 45-64 is a bit curious.

Surprisingly, it is actually Gen-X women (45-64) that had the biggest net shift to the Republicans at -14%, though the youngest blocks of both genders weren’t far behind (-13% for men and -11% for women). Also surprising is that while seniors (65+) of both genders were the only blocks to actually move Left in this election, men actually did so at a slightly faster rate than women (6% vs 4%), though of course they still have a greater distance to go. Note also that the Gender Gap between women and men is now the largest for the youngest voting block (26%), whereas in 2020 it was for Gen-Xers at 28%.

And as I noted in Part I ’s analysis, this is almost entirely being driven by young Latino (and to a much lesser degree Black) voters since young white voters are actually moving to the Left now. Moving on, let’s now consider the trends observable in religious affiliation (or lack thereof) as exemplified in the above title chart: Vote Share by Religion Religion 2012 2016 2020 2024 Protestant 53% 52% 43% 42% Catholic 25% 23% 25% 22% Jewish 2% 3% 2% 2% Something Else 7% 8% 8% 10% None 12% 15% 22% 24% White Evangelical 26% 26% 28% 22% Everyone Else 74% 74% 72% 78% The first thing to note here is the dramatic drop in the Protestant vote between 2016 and 2020, the gradual increase in “Something Else” (Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, etc), and the far more significant increase in “None” (Atheists, Agnostics, etc). Note also the significant drop in the White Evangelical vote this year despite a slight rise in the previous election — for the first time ever they’re now outnumbered by the “Nones”! Perhaps at least some of them have at long last seen the utterly craven moral hypocrisy that is at the center so many fundamentalist Evangelical churches now and no longer wish to be associated with them? We can only hope this trend continues to accelerate.

Dem-Rep Margin by Religion Religion 2012 2016 2020 2024 Protestant -15% -17% -21% -27% Catholic 2% -4% 5% -18% Jewish 39% 48% ? 56% Something Else 51% 33% 40% 25% None 44% 42% 34% 45% White Evangelical -57% -64% -52% -65% All Others 23% 26% 26% 17% The main thing to note here, aside from the steady slide of most Protestants toward Republicans, is the huge lunge by Catholics in the same direction this year, despite their history of being fairly centrist in orientation — this being driven largely by the radical change we’ve already seen in the Latino vote. It might also be worth noting that while Gaza may not have reduced Jewish support for Democrats (if anything, it may actually have ticked up as a result of Biden and Harris largely failing to rein in Israeli actions), it certainly took a toll among Muslim-Americans and other religious minorities. Now let’s turn to the traditional counterpart of Religion — Education: Dem-Rep Margin and Vote Share by Education/Race Education/ Race Margin 2016 2020 2024 Vote Share 2016 2020 2024 White College Grad -3% 3% 7% 37% 32% 33% Non-White Col Grad 50% 40% 33% 13% 10% 10% White Non-College -37% -35% -34% 34% 35% 39% Non-White Non-Col 56% 46% 30% 16% 24% 19% While getting a college education is definitely a demarcation line when it comes to political preferences among white voters (where we’ve seen a 10% move to the Left for college grads since 2016, compared to a more feeble 3% drift among non-college grads), the same cannot be said for non-white voters.

And though the drop in Democratic support among non-white college grads (-17%) hasn’t been quite as bad as for those without a college degree (-26%), they’re both moving in the wrong direction. It’s also worth noting the significant drop off in vote share among all college grads from 2016 to 2020 that continued into this year’s election. This isn’t a reflection of fewer college grads voting now, but rather the success of both the Biden and Trump campaigns in mobilizing large numbers of non-college grads who had seldom if ever voted before 2020, and which continues to affect the results in 2024.

Next we’ll consider the role Marital Status is playing: Vote Share by Marital Status/Gender Marital Status/ Gender 2012 2016 2020 2024 Married Men 29% 29% 30% 28% Married Women 31% 30% 26% 26% Non-Married Men 18% 18% 20% 20% Non-Married Women 23% 23% 23% 27% The only thing really worth noting in terms of relative vote share is the sudden drop in Married Women between 2016 and 2020 who have traditionally constituted the largest block, and how Married Men now actually outnumber them for the first time. Likewise, despite a small bump up in 2020, Non-Married Men still constitute the smallest block here and are increasingly outnumbered by Non-Married Women. Note also from the top table in this diary that the surge in Non-Married Women is being driven by the oldest age cohort (65+) — so even though the Harris campaign wasn’t terribly successful in turning out younger women voters, they certainly excelled in mobilizing the grandmothers among us.

Dem-Rep Margin by Marital Status/Gender Marital Status/ Gender 2012 2016 2020 2024 Married Men -22% -19% -11% -22% Married Women -7% 2% -4% -3% Non-Married Men -16% 2% 7% -2% Non-Married Women 36% 29% 27% 21% Not quite sure what to make of this table, except to note that the Gender Gap between Married Men and Women was actually a bit higher at 21% than this year’s 19%, and between Non-Married Men and Women it was absolutely enormous (52%) back in 2012 for some reason. The most disturbing trend here is the steady deterioration in Democratic support among their most supportive voting block of Non-Married Women — particularly with issue of reproductive rights and access to abortion being so prominent in this year’s election. Now for some miscellaneous comparisons.

First up, the LGBTQ vote: Vote Share by Sexual Orientation Sexual Orientation 2012 2016 2020 2024 LGBTQ 5% 5% 7% 8% All Others 95% 95% 93% 92% While I doubt the size of the LGBTQ community has actually grown much over the years, the fraction of the voting public willing to so self-identify has certainly expanded. Dem-Rep Margin by Sexual Orientation Sexual Orientation 2012 2016 2020 2024 LGBTQ 54% 63% 37% 73% All Others 0% 0% 3% -8% Something here doesn’t quite make sense since it implies the LGBTQ vote was the deciding factor in both 2012 and 2016, and even though Clinton apparently ran up a bigger margin in that vote than Obama, Obama’s popular vote margin (3.9%) was nearly double that of Clinton’s (2.

1%). Likewise, why the relatively large drop in the margin for Biden? Did a significant chunk of the LGBTQ community suddenly think Trump was less of a threat in 2020 than 2016? At least they figured things out for this election and gave Harris their biggest margin ever — unlike certain other blocks (Women in general and Latinos) who definitely picked up on the wrong message. Next up, the Union Household vote: Vote Share by Union Household Status Union Household Status 2012 2016 2020 2024 Union Household 18% 18% 20% 19% All Others 82% 82% 80% 81% Biden was at least successful in turning out more Union Household voters in 2020.

Dem-Rep Margin by Union Household Status Union Household Status 2012 2016 2020 2024 Union Household 18% 9% 16% 8% All Others 1% -1% 2% -3% Harris unfortunately was not as successful at keeping them voting a Democratic ticket. Next to consider is the Military vote: Dem-Rep Margin and Vote Share by Military Status Military Status Margin: 2016 2020 2024 Vote Share: 2016 2020 2024 Military -26% -10% -31% 13% 15% 12% Non-Military 6% 8% 2% 87% 85% 88% While traditionally leaning toward Republicans, the Military vote this time was a real gut punch considering the lengths Trump went in denigrating military service in general and his Alrington Cemetary stunt in particular. Now onto the perpetually perplexed — those voters who only managed to decide who they were going to vote for at the proverbial last minute: Dem-Rep Margin and Vote Share by Decision Time Decision Time Margin: 2012 2016 2020 2024 Vote Share: 2012 2016 2020 2024 Final Week 6% -3% -12% -9% 9% 13% 5% 7% Before Final Week 4% 3% 4% 0% 89% 85% 91% 92% That’s rather disturbing if those who couldn’t make up their minds on who to support until the final week of the election all came down on the Trump side of things — and they apparently helped provide Trump with his winning margin this time.

And finally, at least for this installment, the First-Time voter: Dem-Rep Margin and Vote Share on 1st Time voter Status 1st-Time Status Margin: 2016 2020 2024 Vote Share: 2016 2020 2024 1st-Time Voter 19% 32% -13% 10% 14% 8% Not 1st-Time Voter 0% 0% -2% 90% 84% 92% And there we have it. First-Time voters (a combination of those who just turn 18 since the previous election, and those who had simply never bothered to vote before) who had given both Clinton and Biden their popular vote mandates turned decisively against Harris and sealed all our fates for at least the next four years, and possibly forever. In part III, I’ll examine the all-important question of Economics and what role it played in this election; but until then I highly recommend the analysis of Ben Davis in The Guardian over the weekend.

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