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New missile systems boost the US Navy’s troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program’s firepower, but questions remain about whether upgrades can redeem its costly, embattled legacy. This month, USNI News that US Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro announced significant upgrades to the LCS fleet during the Naval Institute’s Defense Forum in Washington, DC. According to USNI News, the enhancements include installing the Mk 70 Payload Delivery System (PDS) and containerized Mk 41 vertical launching systems, enabling the LCS to launch larger missiles such as the SM-6 and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile.
The report says these upgrades aim to bolster the LCS’s maritime strike capabilities, addressing previous criticisms of the -class’s limited firepower. The report says the Freedom-class USS Beloit (LCS-29) and USS Nantucket (LCS-27) are among the first to receive these systems. It notes that the USS Nantucket showcased the Mk 70 PDS during its recent commissioning.
USNI News mentions the initiative is part of the Over-the-Horizon Weapons System upgrade, which seeks to enhance the US Navy’s operational flexibility and technical advantage, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. As stated in the report, Del Toro emphasized the strategic importance of these upgrades, noting their potential to significantly enhance US naval capabilities globally, including in the Persian Gulf and the Pacific. The report mentions that this move reflects the US Navy’s ongoing efforts to modernize its fleet and maintain a competitive edge over adversaries.
The LCS was designed to address the US Navy’s “green water” capability gap, reflecting a change in naval design philosophy from mission-specific ships to a multi-function platform. However, the program has a troubled history, marred by multiple issues since the first vessel, USS Freedom (LCS-1), was commissioned in 2008. In a November 2024 for The National Interest (TNI), Christian Orr mentions that the LCS program has faced significant criticism due to high costs, maintenance dependencies, and limited survivability.
Orr says that early models, such as the USS Freedom (LCS-1) and USS Independence (LCS-2), have been decommissioned despite their intended 25-year service lives. He states the LCS has been plagued by propulsion system failures, contractor-dependent maintenance, and difficulty swapping mission configurations. He mentions that LCS critics argue that the ships are under-armed and unable to survive in hostile combat environments.
According to him, the initially planned fleet of 55 LCSs was reduced to 35, reflecting the program’s struggles. These issues have led to calls to scrap the LCS program. In an April 2023 Proceedings , Anthony Carrillo argues that it should be scrapped due to its numerous shortcomings and high costs.
Carrillo points out that despite over a decade of development, the LCS has failed to meet expectations, with early models like the USS Freedom and USS Independence being decommissioned after just 13 and 11 years of service, respectively. He argues that the ships have been plagued by propulsion system failures, high maintenance costs, and limited survivability, mainly due to their aluminum hulls, which are prone to cracking and corrosion. He points out that the LCS’s operational range is also restricted, requiring frequent refueling, which hampers its ability to conduct missions effectively.
Additionally, Carrillo says the program’s high costs, estimated at over USD 60 billion for 35 ships and 44 mission modules, do not justify its limited capabilities. Further, he states that the US Navy’s decision to retain only 21 of the 35 planned ships further underscores the program’s failure. Given these issues, Carrillo views the LCS program as a drain on resources, with its ships better suited for cannibalization to support other naval assets.
He argues that the US Navy should focus on more capable and cost-effective platforms like the Constellation-class frigates to meet its operational needs. Viewing the LCS program in a different light, Pete Pagano argues in an August 2024 Proceedings that the LCS concept warrants reconsideration due to its potential to fulfill critical roles in modern naval warfare despite initial flaws. While Pagano acknowledges the program’s rough start, he says recent improvements in propulsion and mission packages show promise.
He points out that the Freedom variant’s propulsion problems have been addressed, and surface warfare and mine countermeasures mission packages have been validated. Pagano mentions that while critics argue that the LCS cannot contribute to high-end combat, advancements in over-the-horizon antiship missiles and Hellfire Longbows have proven otherwise. Further, he says the LCS’s large flight decks and mission bays make it suitable for amphibious operations and supporting US Marine Corps missions.
He also notes that the LCS can serve as fleet scouts, employing manned and unmanned aerial systems to reposition and engage enemy forces rapidly. With the right enhancements, Pagano says the LCS can become a valuable asset in the US Navy’s fleet, capable of executing various missions in diverse operational environments. While the Constellation-class frigates were developed in response to the LCS program’s earlier failures and a capability gap brought by the retirement of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, the Constellation-class program has its challenges.
In a 1945 this month, Robert Farley mentions that the program has encountered significant challenges despite the Constellation class’s promise of advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities and a multi-role platform with 32 vertical launching system (VLS) cells and modern sensors. Farley points out that adapting the European FREMM frigate design to the US Constellation class has increased costs from USD 800 million to USD 1.3 billion, with construction delays and workforce issues exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
He states that the first ship’s delivery has been pushed to 2029, raising concerns about speed, affordability, and scalability. Farley adds that the concurrent construction and design process has resulted in weight growth, potentially reducing the ships’ speed below 25 knots and complicating future modifications. Further, he says Marinette Shipyard, the Constellation class’s builder, has workforce problems that have delayed the program, creating a capability gap as the US Navy retires Ticonderoga-class cruisers.
The push to repurpose the LCS may follow the same lines of effort with its , with the US Navy trying to justify a sunk-cost fallacy. Perhaps the saving grace of trying to revive the LCS would be giving the US more hulls to match China’s People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN), . Asia Times has that historical evidence shows that the side with the larger fleet usually wins naval battles and that sheer numbers often trump short-lived technological advantages.
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