5 days Ago By Firstpost
This week the Chittagong port in Bangladesh had quite an unusual visitor when a ship from Karachi docked at the port for the first time since the liberation of Bangladesh in the year 1971. This ship carrying cargo was hailed by the Pakistani High Commissioner to Dhaka, Syed Ahmed Maroof, as a major step towards bilateral trade between Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, it was anything but an innocuous movement towards thriving trade relations between them.
For India particularly, the strategic anxiety that this development has caused is intense. The two front challenges, which till now only referred to the China-Pakistan axis in the neighbourhood, have become a newer kind of challenge for the country. This time both its western and eastern flanks are facing an adversary in Pakistan and an increasingly Islamist Bangladesh, with the Bay of Bengal region becoming more vulnerable to their influence.
The ouster of Sheikh Hasina has brought in a new reality for India in its immediate neighbourhood. If Hasina was highly sympathetic to Indian security concerns, where she took hard measures to rein in Islamists and militants within the country, the new regime under Mohamed Yunus, propped up by Western interests and powered by support from the Islamists, is far from that. In fact, in the last few months since Hasina’s unceremonious exit, relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh have reached a completely new level of understanding.
One may say that today’s Bangladesh looks increasingly similar to the pre-1971 situation when the Islamist collaborators of Pakistan were running amok in the country. The Razakars, or the specially organised East Pakistani paramilitary force backed by the Pakistani Army, were responsible for the genocide of millions of people, operating concentration camps, and using rape as a weapon of war against Bengali people. In 1971, when the pro-liberation forces backed by Indian support came to power, there was a sigh of relief that now an independent Bangladesh would march forward on the path of a secular-liberal polity.
However, this hope was short-lived as the original proponent of the cause, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was soon assassinated, and the Islamist elements within the country had become powerful once again. A repeat of this ominous trend is now taking place in the country where the Islamists have successfully managed to unseat Hasina in the garb of a student revolution and are dictating the terms of the country’s diplomatic relations as well. In the last three months, Bangladesh has significantly changed from a much more plural country to one that abides by the rule of the Islamists.
Under Yunus’s leadership, a ban imposed on the Jamaat-e-Islami has been lifted as a reciprocal gesture towards their support in ousting Hasina. The country that had discarded the two-nation theory given by Jinnah by seeking independence from Pakistan has recently celebrated Jinnah’s birth anniversary as well. In line with these trends is also its closer shift towards Pakistan as a diplomatic partner.
Unlike the past, when the shadow of 1971 atrocities loomed large, Bangladesh and Pakistan have now elevated various aspects of their relations. Last month, Bangladesh scrapped the practice of physically inspecting cargo coming in from Pakistan. In return, Pakistan has also delisted Bangladeshi ships from its list of prohibited trade vessels.
The Hasina-era tariff and non-tariff barriers on Pakistani imports are all set to be replaced by a free trade agreement that the two countries are going to negotiate in addition to a bilateral investment treaty. Bangladesh has also recently placed a large order of arms and ammunition from Pakistan, which makes the establishment of maritime linkages between the two countries all the more suspicious. As per sources, the containers from the ship that docked at the Chittagong port are still lying in the dock under heavy security, meaning that they may contain contraband items.
In view of the recent developments in Pakistan-Bangladesh relations, especially due to the revival of the maritime link, India’s tensions with regard to security in the Bay of Bengal and the larger Indian Ocean are all set to increase. Firstly, the shipping lane that connects Pakistan to Bangladesh lies outside India’s exclusive economic zone, but it is also very much closer to the country’s vulnerable northeast region. The infiltration from Bangladesh has been a perennial cause of concern, and now with possible supply of arms and ammunition from Pakistan, the security of the northeastern states will be under a severe threat.
Anyways, the demographic change in certain border states, such as Assam, and infiltration in Tripura are significant causes of worry for security agencies. The militant groups in Bangladesh, such as the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen, have been traditionally dependent on Pakistani and Chinese suppliers for arms, and with this route opening up between the two countries, their supplies are likely to increase. What complicates matters further is that they have operatives who also function from the Indian soil.
The danger of infiltration may now be accompanied by more Chinese- and Pakistani-made weapons. Also, despite the claims by Pakistan and Bangladesh that the cargo movement signals growing trade ties, the truth is that the trade between the two countries is dismal, with Bangladesh’s dependence on Indian products instead being very high. Plus, the route is not cost-effective, as it is more than 2600 nautical miles long, with shipment time exceeding more than two weeks.
So no doubt that this revival has more to do with geopolitically challenging India than any genuine desire to bolster trade. Till now, Pakistan and Bangladesh had conducted whatever little trade that they undertook via the transshipment hubs at Singapore or Colombo. But now direct connectivity means that the potential for not just Pakistan but also for China to foment trouble in India’s vicinity has increased.
The Pakistani deep state, along with China, has got a new lever to pull against us. This aligns closely with China’s own ‘strings of pearls’ policy, where it is trying to encircle India in the maritime domain by setting up naval assets in various countries in the subcontinent. Ironically, Bangladesh has often offered the Chittagong port to many countries, including India, in the past for trade purposes.
During Hasina’s tenure in power, India was very keen on using the port as a sea link for its landlocked northeast. But now with the port looking to become a den of suspicious activities, such plans may likely be shelved. Any further linkage with a port that receives Pakistani ships, that too with a shoddy inspection mechanism in place, spells only more trouble for India.
India would also have to watch out closely if any threat emanates from the region to its security. But this doesn’t mean that India has no leverage of its own. Bangladesh is still dependent on India, which is a far stronger economy than Pakistan, for its subsistence needs.
If the push comes to shove, India must be ready to use these levers to deter the Bangladeshi regime from acting against Indian interests. The game in the Bay of Bengal is all set to heat up, but India must also let other powers in the region know that Indian concerns are paramount to anything else. The author is a New Delhi-based commentator on geopolitics and foreign policy.
She holds a PhD from the Department of International Relations, South Asian University. She tweets @TrulyMonica. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author.
They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views..
